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TRUST TERM CONSTRAINTS AFTER REPEAL
OF THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
+ELLY ! -OORE

I. INTRODUCTION
State law generally provides settlors with signiﬁcant ﬂexibility in establishing
trust terms.1 This ﬂexibility is not unfettered, however, as state law typically
restricts a settlor’s freedom in regards to spousal interests, creditor rights, and
rules against perpetuities, if still extant.2 Beyond these state imposed restrictions,
however, settlors enjoy tremendous freedom under state law to choose the terms
that govern their trusts. Yet, for clients whose wealth levels, asset characteristics, or
beneﬁciary attributes trigger the need for advanced estate planning, this freedom
may be lost, and the trust documents created can be complex, containing many
sophisticated provisions related to federal tax and other laws.3 Among the federal
laws constricting trust term selection is the federal estate tax, the long-term status
of which is currently uncertain. This article examines the impact of the federal
estate tax on the selection of state law trust terms, concluding that permanent
repeal of the estate tax will not dramatically reduce the complexities and constraints
imposed by federal law in the crafting of estate planning trust documents.
In 2001, Congress enacted the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act, (“EGTRRA”) affecting a temporal compromise between those seeking
4

* Former Director of Tax LL.M. Programs, Lecturer in Law, Washington University in St.
Louis School of Law. Thanks to Donald Johnson, Jr., my research assistant, and David Frederick
for his editing assistance.
1

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 (amended 2005).

2

Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, 0ERPETUITIES OR 4AXES %XPLAINING THE 2ISE OF THE
0ERPETUAL 4RUST, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465, 2466 (2006).
3
See, e.g., JEFFREY N. PENNELL, WEALTH TRANSFER PLANNING
17-1, 18-1 (2005).

AND

DRAFTING 8-1, 9-1, 10-1,

4
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat.
38 (2001) (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter EGTRRA].
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permanent repeal of the estate tax and those favoring preservation of the estate tax
in some form.5 For those proposing repeal, the act triggered a one year repeal of
the estate tax in calendar year 2010.6 This one year “death tax”7 holiday follows a
staggered increase in the amount of property that could be transferred tax free at
death under the estate tax between 2001 and 2009.8 For those opposing repeal,
the estate tax is reinstated in 2011 at 2001 year levels.9 EGTRRA also repealed
the generation skipping transfer tax (“GSTT”) for 2010 with an accompanying
increase in exemptions prior to 2010 and a reinstatement in 2011, also at 2001
year levels.10 The gift tax is left in place, with an increase in the amount of property
that could be gratuitously transferred inter vivos and a reduction in rates.11
Since EGTRRA was enacted, numerous unsuccessful attempts have been
made to make the repeal of the estate tax permanent.12 Putting aside the inherent
compliance difﬁculties in the staged and temporary change and repeal of the estate
tax foisted on taxpayers by EGTRRA,13 the perceived imposition of compliance
complexity by the estate tax on taxpayers is one of the arguments proponents
of making permanent the death tax repeal posit.14 It is said that estate planning
documents are longer, more complex and more expensive due to the lawyer’s need
to plan around the estate tax.15 If the estate and GSTT taxes are repealed, the
argument continues, this burden on taxpayers and the attendant intrusions on the
freedom under state trust law to select trust terms will be removed.16

5
See Reginald Mombrun, ,ETS 0ROTECT OUR %CONOMY AND $EMOCRACY FROM 0ARIS (ILTON 4HE #ASE
FOR +EEPING THE %STATE 4AX, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 61, 61–3 (2007).
6

EGTRRA § 901(a)(2) (2001) (providing the return of the estate tax in 2011).

7

See Daniel W. Matthews, ! &IGHT TO THE $EATH 3LAYING THE %STATE 4AX 2EPEAL (YDRA, 28
WHITTIER L. REV. 663, 665 (2006) (discussing the adoption and manipulation of the term “death
tax” by the proponents of repeal to sway public opinion against the estate tax).
8

See I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010 (West 2002).

9

Id. § 2011.

10

Id.

11

Id. § 2011, 2503.

See Dustin Stamper, '/0 (OPING FOR 2ESURRECTION OF %STATE 4AX 2EFORM IN , TAX NOTES
TODAY (Tax Analysts), Nov. 16, 2005, at 220–2, available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT 220-2.
12

13

See Michael J. Graetz,  -ILLION 5NNECESSARY 2ETURNS ! &RESH 3TART FOR THE 53 4AX 3YSTEM,
112 YALE L.J. 261, 262 (2002).
14
See Mombrun, supra note 5; see also Kristine M. Schlachter, 2EPEAL OF THE &EDERAL %STATE 4AX
AND 'IFT 4AX 7ILL IT (APPEN AND (OW 7ILL IT !FFECT OUR 0ROGRESSIVE 4AX 3YSTEM, 19 VA. TAX REV. 781,
798 (2000).

Stephen Vasek, $EATH 4AX 2EPEAL !LTERNATIVE 2EFORM 0ROPOSALS, 92 TAX NOTES 955, 957

15

(2001).
16

See Schlachter, supra note 14.
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The imposition of this complexity manifests itself in the selection of terms
used in trust documents.17 In a narrow view of estate planning, repeal proponents
may be correct. If estate planning is deﬁned solely as the documentation of
attempts to avoid and/or minimize only the impact of the estate tax, it is self
evident that repealing the tax successfully removes complexity from trust terms.
In a broader understanding of estate planning, however, one discovers that estate
planning is more than avoiding the “death taxes,” and includes planning tied to
speciﬁc asset characteristics, and attempts to avail other federal beneﬁts or avoid
other federal taxes.18 This article takes the broader view of estate planning, and
evaluates the effect estate tax repeal has on the overall constraints imposed by
federal law on the ﬂexibility in trust term selection allowed under state trust law.
The impact of federal estate tax and other laws on trust terms selection takes
two avenues: One, the magnitude of its impact as measured by the number of trusts
created as a result of planning related to federal laws; and two, the variations in
estate planning trust documents dictated by federal law requirements. This paper
addresses the second of these avenues. I note, however, that the overall magnitude
of the impact of the estate tax may be small. As only 0.3% of Americans incur
estate tax liability, on average, 99.7% of Americans are left free to ignore the
estate tax in most planning regards.19 While not every American will create a trust
and, perhaps, the repeal of the estate tax may cause a reduction in the number of
trusts established, for those that create trusts, federal laws other than the estate
tax may limit the trust terms they select. The potential impact of rules related to
trusts receiving payments from deferred beneﬁts plans may have on state trust
law is signiﬁcant because 57% of the nation’s households have retirement savings
in a deferred format, including 73% of retired households.20 Also, whereas only
6,300 estates may be impacted by the federal estate tax in 2009,21 upwards of

17
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 2055–56 (West 2002) (dictating trust terms required for a decedent to
obtain estate tax marital and charitable deductions).

See Richard C. Spain, %STATE 0LANNING FOR A $ISABLED "ENElCIARY, PRAC. LAW., Oct. 1991, at
29; see also FRANK J. CROKE & WILLIAM F. CROKE, FAMILY TRUSTS 35–150 (1998); R. Randazzo, %LDER
,AW AND %STATE 0LANNING FOR 'AY AND ,ESBIAN )NDIVIDUALS AND #OUPLES, 6 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISER 1
(2004); %STATE 4AX #ONCERNS .O ,ONGER $RIVE -OST 0LANNING $ECISIONS, 14 ELDER L. ISSUES 5 (Fleming
and Curti, PLC, Tucson, Ariz.), July 31, 2006, at 5, available at http://www.elder-law.com/2006/
Issue1405.html.
18

19
Pub. Citizen & United for a Fair Econ., 3PENDING -ILLIONS TO 3AVE "ILLIONS, TAX NOTES
TODAY, (Tax Analysts), Apr. 26, 2006, at 80-28, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 80-28 [hereinafter
3PENDING -ILLIONS TO 3AVE "ILLIONS].
20
Sharon A. Devaney & Sophia T. Chiremba, #OMPARING THE 2ETIREMENT 3AVINGS OF THE "ABY
"OOMERS AND /THER #OHORTS, Bureau of Labor Statistics ed., 2005, http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/
cm20050114ar01p1.htm.
21
See 3PENDING -ILLIONS TO 3AVE "ILLIONS SUPRA note 19 (estimating that for 2006 decedents only
6,300 estates will be subject to the estate tax, however with the estate tax exemption amount increasing
from $2 million to $3.5 million in 2009, the ﬁgure may be even lower for 2009 decedents). See also
Brian G. Raub, &EDERAL %STATE 4AX 2ETURNS &ILED FOR  $ECEDENTS, 27 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 115,
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5,000,000 individuals own shares in an S-corporation and may be impacted by
the S-corporation eligibility provisions regarding trusts as shareholders.22
This analysis shall proceed as the combination of several sections, each
addressing particular issues relevant to the inquiry. Section II outlines general
trust law as typically provided by state law. Section III discusses select limitations
imposed on trust term selections by the estate tax. Section IV addresses the change
in the step up basis rules which become effective with the repeal of the estate
tax, and the possible inﬂuence the change may have on trust term selections.
Section V evaluates the gift tax’s continuing inﬂuence on trust term selection.
Section VI discusses select income tax and supplementary security income
provisions that impinge on state trust law ﬂexibility. Section VII evaluates the
federal constraints on trust term selection remaining after repeal of the estate
tax, concluding that, although the repeal may somewhat reduce incursions into
state law granted ﬂexibility, the overall impact of remaining federal laws mute the
repeal’s impact. This article does not purport to discuss all of the aspects of the
federal laws mentioned. Rather, the goal is to survey features of these laws which
estate planners and settlors must consider in drafting trusts to achieve various
planning objectives.

II. STATE TRUST LAW
Under state law, settlors, also known as grantors, are generally free to create
trusts to accomplish any lawful purpose.23 The primary restrictions imposed on
trust creation by state law are related to grantor capacity, necessary components
and parties, creditor protection, spousal property right protection, and rules
against perpetuities.24
Having a lawful purpose is a threshold requirement for the creation of a trust.25
Most trusts established for estate planning purposes have a lawful purpose such
as asset management at life and/or death, provision for long term care of family

115 (Spring 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04esreturnbul.pdf (reporting that
19,294 estates incurred estate tax liability for 2004 decedents when the exemption amount was
$1.5 million).
Kelly Bennett, 3 #ORPORATION 2ETURNS, 22 STAT.
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/00scorp.pdf.
22

OF

INCOME BULL. 63, 69 (Spring 2003),

23

See Joel C. Dobris, #HANGES IN THE 2OLE AND THE &ORM OF THE 4RUST AT THE .EW -ILLENNIUM OR
7E $ONT (AVE TO 4HINK OF %NGLAND !NYMORE, 62 ALB. L. REV. 543, 543–45 (1998); see also UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 404 (amended 2005).
See GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUST 1, 19–26, 178, 183, (Jesse
H. Choper et al. eds., 1973); see also J. R. Kemper, 6ALIDITY OF )NTER 6IVOS 4RUST %STABLISHED BY /NE
3POUSE 7HICH )MPAIRS THE /THER 3POUSES $ISTRIBUTIVE 3HARE OR /THER 3TATUTORY 2IGHTS IN 0ROPERTY, 39
A.L.R. 3d 14 (1971).
24

25

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404.
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members, minimizing taxes, or insuring access to welfare beneﬁts.26 Unlawful
purposes involve requirements for the trustee to commit criminal or tortious
acts.27
If the trust is testamentary, the required grantor capacity is the same standard
as for wills: knowledge of assets, awareness of natural fruits of bounty and an
understanding of what the executed document does.28 If the trust is inter vivos,
the standard may differ slightly depending upon whether the trust is revocable,
only taking ﬁnal effect upon the settlor’s death as a will substitute, or whether it
is an irrevocable trust. In the former, the will standard is generally applied. In the
latter, a contract capacity is required.29
The necessary parties in a private trust are the settlor, at least one trustee,
and at least one individual beneﬁciary.30 The settlor must manifest intent to
create a trust in appropriate form.31 Although oral trusts are permissible, in trusts
involving real property the statute of frauds typically requires a written declaration
of trust.32 The settlor names the trustee and chooses the beneﬁciaries. Courts will
not necessarily invalidate a trust in the absence of a trustee and are hesitant to
thrust the mantle of trusteeship on an unwilling party.33 If a trustee refuses or
resigns his position, the courts will appoint a replacement rather than invalidate
the trust.34 Trustees are subjected to strict ﬁduciary obligations to which they
must willingly agree, but which the settlor may tailor with the trust’s terms.35
Individual beneﬁciaries are necessary to enforce the terms of the trust against the
trustee.36 In charitable trust situations, this requirement is unnecessary because

AND

26
See VALERIE VOLLMAR, AMY MORRIS HESS & ROBERT WHITMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRUSTS
ESTATES, 173–75 (2002).

GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUST AND TRUSTEES § 211 (rev. 2d
ed. 1984).
27

28

UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 401, 601.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 19 (1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
(2003); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402.
29

30

OF

TRUSTS § 11

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 17; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 10.

31

For instance, due to the statute of frauds in most states, a trust involving real property must
be in writing. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Duckworth, 388 S.W.2d 870, 876 (Mo. 1965).
32

Id.

33

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 701(b); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 35.

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 704(c); see, e.g., In re Therese D. Steckler Trust, 678 So.2d 620, 622–23
(La. Ct. App. 1996).
34

35

UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 801–804.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402.
36
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the attorney general of the relevant state enforces the trust terms.37 Closely related
are honorary trusts, which are allowed under the Uniform Probate Code (“UPC”)
in certain situations.38
Another necessary component is the trust property, also known as res.39
Trusts are designed to allow the bifurcation of property rights between legal and
equitable rights.40 The trustee must be given legal title over the trust property,
while the beneﬁciary will hold beneﬁcial title.41 The type of delivery required
to perfect the trust ranges from actual deeds/titles to symbolic delivery.42 Trusts
without property are called dry trusts, and were historically ineffective.43 Under
the UPC, such trusts are allowed in select situations, such as trusts anticipating
receipt of life insurance death proceeds or transfers from a probate estate.44
The rule against perpetuities has historically limited the terms of trust
duration.45 Generally stated, the rule against perpetuities requires that, in the
transfer of property, the gift must vest within 21 years of a life-in-being at the
beginning of the transfer arc.46 This rule is a compromise between not allowing
dead hands to control property indeﬁnitely, while allowing settlors to control
property for the use of people they theoretically might have known, such as their
children and grandchildren.47 Recently, states have begun repealing their rules
against perpetuities, which has occasioned a liberalization of trust modiﬁcation
procedures to address the changing circumstances that might impact a perpetual
trust.48
37
See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, 2EGULATING THE -ANAGEMENT OF #HARITIES 4RUST ,AW #ORPORATE ,AW
AND 4AX ,AW, 21 U. HAWAII L. REV. 593, 622 (1999); cf. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (granting
settlor standing to enforce a charitable trust).
38
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 408 (2006) (trusts for care of animal) and § 409 (trusts without
ascertainable beneﬁciary for general noncharitable purposes and trusts for a speciﬁc noncharitable
purpose other than the care of an animal).
39

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 74; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. i.

40

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 3.

41

Id. at Ch. 1, Introductory Note.

42

See, e.g., Newton v. Wimsatt, 791 S.W.2d 823, 829–30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Bakewell v.
Clemens, 190 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Mo. 1945) (symbolic delivery).
See Kully v. Goldman, 305 N.W.2d 800, 802–3 (Neb. 1981); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
TRUSTS § 75.
43

44

OF

UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-511 (amended 2006).

See R. Zebulon Law et al., 4HE 2ULE !GAINST 0ERPETUITIES !N 5PDATE, 24 TAX MGMT, EST.,
GIFTS & TR. J. 222, 222–23 (1999); David M. Becker, 4AILORING 0ERPETUITIES TO !VOID 0ROBLEMS,
PROB. AND PROP., March–April 1995, at 11.
45

46
CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY: AN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE COMMON LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND ITS MODERN
APPLICATION 243 (3d ed. 2002).
47

See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 2, at 2470.

48

Id. at 2472–81.
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Creditor protection is a major component of state law.49 As far as the settlor is
concerned, if he is insolvent at the time he creates an inter vivos trust, his creditors
may be able to reach these trust assets, even if the trust is irrevocable.50 If a settlor
is solvent at the time he creates the trust, but subsequently becomes insolvent,
the assets of an inter vivos irrevocable trust may not be reachable by the settlor’s
creditors.51 If revocable, the assets are reachable whether or not the settlor was
insolvent at the time the trust was established.52 From the standpoint of the
creditors of trust beneﬁciaries, generally the assets will not be reachable under
public policy if the trust has a spendthrift provision.53 Absent such a provision in
the trust document, creditors may be able to attach a beneﬁciary’s trust distribution
expectancy.54
Spousal rights and other support rights may also trump the trust terms
otherwise selected by the settlor. This may present itself in one of three forms:
the trust was testamentary, the trust was illusory, or the settlor’s creation of the
trust was intended to deprive the surviving spouse of her statutory distributive
share.55 These three forms represent the split among the states on the proper
method of unwinding the settlor’s intent and awarding the surviving spouse her
statutory distributive share.56 The settlor may not retain such extensive powers of
ownership and control as to cause an inter vivos trust to be testamentary in nature,
in essence a will.57 What level of retained powers and ownership is required to
render an inter vivos trust testamentary is unclear and ultimately is determined on
a case-by-case basis.58 Generally an inter vivos trust will be deemed testamentary in
cases where the transfer occurred in contemplation of death.59 Illusory trusts can
be stricken if it is shown that the settlor’s transfer to trust was not genuine, but
merely an instrument to hide the settlor’s retention of control and ownership.60

49

#REDITORS 2IGHTS !GAINST 4RUST !SSETS, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 735, 740–41 (1987).

50

MO. REV. STAT. § 428.039 (Vernon 2003).

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505 (amended 2005); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156
(1959).
51

52

Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 204 So. 2d 856 (Miss. 1967).

See Ann S. Emanuel, 3PENDTHRIFT 4RUSTS )TS 4IME TO #ODIFY THE #OMPROMISE, 72 NEB. L. REV
179, 188 (1993); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a) (trust invalid as to settlor’s creditors); cf. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157(a) (wife or child of beneﬁciary for support, or wife for alimony, may
satisfy claim despite spendthrift provisions).
53

54

UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503(c).

55

See Kemper, supra note 24, at 24.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 14; see also In re Estate of Weitzman, 724 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

60

Kemper, supra note 24, at 14.
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If the settlor’s intent when creating the trust is to retain beneﬁcial control and
ownership during lifetime and subsequently at death deny the surviving spouse
her statutory distributive share, then the trust can be stricken as fraudulent against
the surviving spouse.61
Beyond the preceding overview of state trust law requirements, state law is
otherwise very ﬂexible in regards to trust terms chosen by the settlor. For instance,
if a trust is established by a settlor with capacity, having all of the necessary
components and parties, the settlor is free to deﬁne the four main categories of
trust terms: retained powers and rights; administrative and ﬁduciary powers;
dispositive schemes; and termination terms.62 Retained powers include powers
such as the right to revoke, alter, amend, choose between named beneﬁciaries,
invest trust property in a non-ﬁduciary fashion, and borrow trust assets.63
Administrative and ﬁduciary powers are those imposed on the trustee and which
may trump state law of ﬁduciary duties in many instances.64 These powers may
include the discretion to allocate receipts to income and principal in a manner
contrary to the state’s Principal and Income Act, invest in unproductive property,
and hold certain types of assets.65 The dispositive scheme relates to the current
beneﬁciary, determining if, when and in what manner such beneﬁciary is entitled
to income and/or principal of the trust.66 The termination terms describe the
remainder beneﬁciary, the point of termination, and may include the grant of a
power of appointment to one or more individuals.67
State law ﬂexibility, however, is constrained signiﬁcantly by the myriad of
federal tax and related provisions. For instance, retaining the power to revoke a
trust has gift, estate, and income tax ramiﬁcations that, if the settlor wishes to
avoid in some manner, the settlor must carefully narrow his term selections. Even
after repeal of the estate tax, various other federal laws will restrict trust term
selection.

61

Kemper, supra note 24, at 14; see also Hanke v. Hanke, 459 A.2d 246, 248 (N.H. 1983).

See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 815 (amended 2005); cf. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 816 (enumerating
general powers contemplated by the general grant of trusteeship).
62

63
See, e.g., Cleveland Trust Co. v. White, 15 N.E.2d 627 (Ohio 1938); BOGERT, supra note 27,
§§ 993, 1061, 1291.
64

See, e.g., BOGERT, supra note 27, §§ 551, 1292–1302.

65

See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 469.901 (Vernon 2003).

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 49 (2003); In re Madison Cmty. Found., 707
N.W.2d 285 (Wis. Ct. App. 2005).
66

See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 61; Tudor v. Vail, 80 N.E. 590, 592 (Mass.
1907) (concerning termination by exercise of power of appointment).
67
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III. FEDERAL ESTATE TAX
The federal estate tax impacts trust term selections in many ways. This article
will highlight the terms imposed to obtain estate tax marital deductions, the
most prominently sought after method of minimizing the tax. This deduction
constrains state trust law ﬂexibility because obtaining the deduction requires
compliance with strict statutory requirements.68
To obtain the marital deduction for property placed in trust for a surviving
spouse, the decedent must provide that the trust is either a general power of
appointment trust, qualiﬁed terminal interest property trust (“QTIP”), estate
trust, or a hybrid marital-charitable remainder trust.69 For all but the estate trust,
for transfers to these trusts to qualify for the marital deduction, the trust terms
must provide the surviving spouse with the right to all trust income for life, at
least annually.70
For transfers to a general power of appointment trust to qualify for the
marital deduction, the trust terms must provide the surviving spouse the power
to redirect the property from the settlor’s named remainderman, potentially in
direct contradiction of the settlor’s dispositive scheme.71 Similarly, the estate
trust requires the trust property be paid directly to the surviving spouse’s estate,
allowing the survivor’s will to dictate the ultimate disposition.72
To optimize minimization of the estate tax, a credit shelter trust is frequently
created in tandem with a marital trust.73 A credit shelter trust is designed to take
maximum advantage of the estate and gift tax uniﬁed credit amount.74 A common
estate planning technique is designed to create a zero-estate-tax posture in the
estate of the ﬁrst to die.75 This is accomplished by dividing the after expense
property of the decedent’s gross estate into two shares: one equal to the remaining
amount of a decedent’s uniﬁed credit amount, and the remainder of the estate
to a marital trust.76 In so doing, the estate tax liability is kept at zero at the time
of the death of the ﬁrst spouse. The share distributed to the credit shelter trust
is shielded by the applicable credit amount stemming from the uniﬁed credit

68

See I.R.C. § 2056 (West 2002).

Id; see SEBASTIAN V. GRASSI, JR., A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TRUSTS 27–31 (2004).
69

TO

DRAFTING MARITAL DEDUCTION

70

See I.R.C. § 2056.

71

Id. § 2056(b)(5).

72

See Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(c)-2(b) (1994).

73

PENNELL, supra note 3, at 7-9.

74

See id. at 7-5.

75

Id. at 7-8.

76

BORIS I. BITTKER ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 545–47 (2005).
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amount and the balance of the estate is poured into a qualifying marital trust and
thereby shielded in the estate of the ﬁrst spouse to die from transfer taxation by
the marital deduction.77
The marital deduction is prefaced on the concept that a married couple is one
economic unit and should have their combined property taxed only once by the
estate tax.78 The trust terms imposed to obtain the marital deduction insure this
policy, as the required trust terms or attendant elections insure the property in the
marital trust be taxed in the surviving spouse’s estate at the death of the surviving
spouse.79 A general power of appointment trust is included in the surviving
spouse’s estate by virtue of the required power, a QTIP trust requires election by
the surviving spouse, and the estate trust is included by virtue of the requirement
the trust be paid to the estate of the surviving spouse at the surviving spouse’s
death.80
The credit shelter trust, on the other hand, is designed to avoid the estate tax
at the surviving spouse’s death, requiring the settlor to carefully choose trust terms
to avoid granting the surviving spouse or any other beneﬁciary any powers, rights,
or interest in the credit shelter trust that would trigger estate tax inclusion.81

IV. CHANGE OF STEP UP REGIME
Currently, the basis of any property included in a decedent’s gross estate is
stepped up to a date of death value basis, which eliminates built in capital gains
when it passes to the decedent’s heirs.82 For instance, a piece of property with a $5
basis in the hands of the decedent, but which is included on decedent’s estate tax
return at a $10 date of death value, has a $10 basis in the hands of the estate and
ultimate gratuitous recipient. There is an exception for property deemed income
in respect of decedent,83 but otherwise this stepped upped basis regime eliminates
the eventual taxation of any pre-death appreciation of decedent’s property.84

77

Id.; PENNELL, supra note 3.

78

PENNELL, supra note 3, at 7-1.

79

I.R.C. §§ 2033, 2041, 2044, 2056 (West 2002).

80

Id.

81

PENNELL, supra note 3, at 5-1, 7-9.

82

I.R.C. § 1014; Kent N. Schneider, 4HE -ODIlED #ARRYOVER "ASIS 2ULES OF )2# e  #URRENT
Implications of Fiduciaries, 58 J. MO. B. 264, 264 (2002).
83

I.R.C. §§ 691, 1014(c).

84

See Janis v. Comm’r, 469 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2006).
This [step up] rule avoids a double tax on the appreciation in the value of the
property that occurred prior to death. The estate tax, which is based on the fair
market value at the time of death, taxes this unrealized capital gain. If the cost
basis to the heirs was the acquisition cost to the decedent, the unappreciated capital

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol9/iss1/8

10

Moore: Trust Term Constraints after Repeal of the Federal Estate Tax

TRUST TERM CONSTRAINTS

2009

273

The repeal of the estate tax is accompanied by repeal of the current step up
in basis rules under § 1014.85 In the year of repeal, and presumably thereafter if
repeal is made permanent, the step up in basis will be lost in some cases. Replacing
it will be a step up in basis on the ﬁrst three million dollars of property passing to a
surviving spouse and $1,300,000 of property passing otherwise.86 This change will
present many bookkeeping and other difﬁculties to estates and in some situations
may inﬂuence trust terms.87 For instance, in estate plans with charitable bequests,
the document may need to provide that high value, low basis properties are
transferred to charity, and thus do not take up the limited allowable step up. The
need for separate trusts for surviving spouses to differentiate between the property
receiving the step up and property not so receiving may also be necessary.88

V. FEDERAL GIFT TAX
EGTRRA left the gift tax in force in 2010, establishing the uniﬁed credit
amount for life time gifts at $1,000,000, effectively disunifying the gift and estate
tax during the run up to the year of repeal.89 Despite some scholars arguing that
the gift tax should be repealed if the estate tax is repealed,90 the discussions to
make EGTRRA repeal permanent currently envision leaving the gift tax in place.91
Whereas the gift tax’s initial purpose was to prevent avoidance of the estate tax
through the artiﬁce of lifetime giving, the gift tax is now seen as an anti-income
shifting provision.92

gain would be taxed a second time. In order to avoid this result, the cost basis of
the property when it is later sold is the fair market value at the time of death. . . .
The only gain that is taxed on its subsequent resale is that incurred as a result of an
increase in value after the date of death. The statutory scheme “express[es] Congress’s
intent that unrealized gain taxed to the decedent’s estate at his death shall not be
subjected to another tax when it is subsequently realized by the estate or a legatee.”
Id. (quoting Levin v. United States, 373 F.2d 434, 438 (1st Cir. 1967)).
85

EGTRRA §§ 541–542 (2001).

86

Id. § 542.

87

See &EDERAL %STATE 4AX 5NCERTAINTY IN 0LANNING 5NDER THE #URRENT ,AW (EARING "EFORE THE 3
Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Conrad Teitell, Principal, Cummings &
Lockwood, LLC) (comparing the approach of EGTRRA to a roller coaster ride of increasing
exemptions, followed by a precipitous fall in the year of repeal and a return in the next year to the
pre-EGTRRA system).
88

Id.

89

EGTRRA §§ 511, 521.

See Alana J. Darnall, 4OWARD AN )NTEGRATED 4AX 4REATMENT OF 'IFTS AND )NHERITANCES, 34 SETON
HALL L. REV. 671, 688–94 (2004).
90

91

Id.

92

Imposition of gift taxes ensures that taxpayers in high income-tax brackets who transfer
income-producing property to those in low income-tax brackets, thereby reducing income taxes
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The gift tax provides almost identical marital deduction requirements as the
estate tax.93 If properly drafted, a settlor receives a 100% gift tax deduction for
all property passing to the trust for the spouse in a properly formed trust.94 To
obtain a marital deduction through a gift in trust, § 2523 requires the trust be in
the same form as the estate tax requires under § 2056, discussed in the previous
section.95
State trust law permits grantors to retain rights in trusts created inter vivos.
Grantors may retain rights such as the right to income, or remainders and powers
such as the right to revoke. The right to retain either the current or remainder
interest in a trust leads to the creation of split interest gifts.96 For instance, in
cases where the grantor retains the right to the current income interest but
irrevocably designates another to receive the remainder, the grantor has made a
gift of the remainder interest. The inverse is true in situations where the grantor
has retained the right to the remainder but irrevocably gives the current interest
to another. Under standard gift tax valuation concepts, the value of the gift given
in these cases would be limited to the actuarial valuation of the remainder or
current income right in the trust so given.97 Although state law allows these split
interests trusts, trusts in which grantors retain the income or remainder interest
are denied actuarial valuation for gift tax purposes if the interest given is given
to a family member.98 Instead, § 2702 provides that unless one of two detailed
current beneﬁciary terms are used in the trust, the value of the gift made is the
total value of the property transferred to the trust.99 In essence, if the prescribed
current beneﬁciary terms are not used, the value of the gift is determined as if the
value of the retained interest is zero.100
To avoid having the retained interest valued at zero for gift tax purposes,
§ 2702 provides that the current beneﬁciary interest be either an annuity interest
or a unitrust interest.101 An annuity interest is “an arrangement under which a
determinable amount is paid periodically, but not less often than annually, for

paid on the income from the property, pay some tax upfront (the gift tax). Hence, the gift tax is
said to supplement the income tax in this regard. See, e.g., Dickman v. Comm’r, 465 U.S. 330, 339
(1984).
93

See I.R.C. §§ 2522–2523 (West 2002).

94

Id.

95

See I.R.C. § 2523.

96

%G, F. Ladson Boyle, %VALUATING 3PLIT )NTEREST 6ALUATION, 24 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 n.7 (1989).

97

I.R.C. § 2512; Treas. Reg. § 25.7520-1 (2000).

98

I.R.C. § 2702(e).

99

See id. § 2702.

100

Id.

101

Id. § 2702(b).
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a speciﬁed term of years or for the life or lives of certain individuals.”102 The
unitrust interest is “the right pursuant to the instrument of transfer to receive
payment, no less often than annually, of a ﬁxed percentage of the net fair market
value, determined annually, of the property which funds the unitrust interest.”103
If these terms are followed, the gift tax value is calculated by accounting for the
value of the retained interest, thus reducing the value of the potentially taxable
gift from 100% of the property transferred.
With repeal of the estate tax, much of the concern addressed by § 2702
seemingly disappears. Federal tax law designates trusts in which the grantor retains
rights such as income and remainder interests, or powers to revoke as “grantor
trusts.”104 Under current law, grantor trusts are generally ignored for income tax
purposes.105 Under EGTRRA new § 2511(c), grantor trusts are also ignored for
gift tax purposes in the year of repeal (and presumably thereafter if repeal is made
permanent).106 Thus, seemingly no gift can be made of an interest in a grantor
retained interest trust once § 2511(c) is in force.107
The potential removal of restrictions imposed by § 2702 may simply usher
in a new tax constraint on trust term selection: namely, settlors may intentionally
alter their trust terms to trigger grantor trust status in order to avoid imposition
of the gift tax.108

VI. OTHER FEDERAL LAWS
In addition to the estate and gift taxes, a settlor’s term selections are constrained
by a myriad of other federal laws. As it would be impossible to address all of
these laws, this section focuses on the impact on settlor term selections of select
S-corporation, retirement beneﬁt, and federal supplementary security income
provisions.

102

Id.

103

I.R.C. § 2702(b); Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(e)(2)(vii)(a) (2003).

104

I.R.C. §§ 671–679.

105

Id. § 677.

106

EGTRRA § 511(e).

107

This amendment complements the gift tax’s goal of preventing income tax avoidance: If a
transfer is made that does not shift income away from a grantor because of the grantor trust rules,
no income attributes have been shifted and imposition of the gift tax is unnecessary.
108
See, e.g., Michael D. Milligan, 3ALE TO A $EFECTIVE 'RANTOR 4RUST !N !LTERNATIVE TO A '2!4,
23 EST. PLAN. 1 (1996) (discussing an estate planning technique to avoid transfer tax restrictions by
conducting transactions with a trust intentionally termed as a “grantor trust”).
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A. S-Corporation
If the res of the trust consists of stock in an S-corporation, the terms of any trust
created in an estate plan are severely limited by the eligible shareholder provisions
of the income tax code.109 Normally, C-corporations incur income taxation at
both the corporate entity level and the shareholder level.110 S-corporations are a
statutory exception to the historical double taxation of C-corporations; they are
allowed a conduit form of taxation straight to the shareholder, resulting in only one
level of taxation.111 Federal law imposes strict requirements for an entity to qualify
as an S-corporation, including eligible shareholder requirements.112 Among these
requirements are limitations of the types of trusts that may hold S-corporation
stock. Only the following trusts may hold stock in an S-corporation: a grantor
trust,113 including two years after the grantor dies; testamentary trusts for two
years; voting trusts; qualiﬁed subchapter S trusts (“QSSTs”); electing small
business trusts (“ESBTs”); and certain retirement plan trusts.114
To establish a trust satisfying any of these allowed trust formats requires the
settlor to adhere to strict requirements. For illustration, this article outlines the
impact of the QSST constraints on state trust ﬂexibility.
A QSST requires the trust terms to provide that:
i)

there is only one beneﬁciary;

ii) corpus distributions during the current beneﬁciary life can only
be made to him;
iii) the current beneﬁciaries’ income interest must terminate at
earlier of trust termination or his death; and
iv) trust assets must be distributed to the current beneﬁciary if his
death triggers trust termination.115
The ﬁrst requirement alone restricts a settlor’s freedom, preventing the use of
a spray or sprinkle trust format and forcing the creation of multiple trusts if

109

I.R.C. § 1361.

110

Id. § 301.

111

Id. § 1361.

112

Id. §§ 1361(b), (c).

113

Id. §§ 671–679.

114

I.R.C. § 1361(c)(2).

115

Id. §§ 1361(d)(3)(A), (d)(4)(A).
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multiple beneﬁciaries are desired. If a multiple beneﬁciary trust is desired, ESBT
status, which is not as beneﬁcial from a tax standpoint, must be selected.116

" 2ETIREMENT "ENElTS
Federal income tax law allows individuals to defer income tax liability on
appropriate contributions made to certain retirement plans.117 Subject to detailed
distribution requirements, the contributor does not have to include the contributed
amounts in income until withdrawn.118 Upon the death of the contributor, the
deferred nature of the balance of the retirement plan may be preserved if the
contributor names an allowable “designated beneﬁciary” to follow the contributor.
The rules and regulations governing the creation and management of deferred
retirement plans, allowing taxpayers to realize income without recognizing it
until withdrawn from the account, are complex. Of particular concern to estate
planners are the rules deﬁning the terms necessary to consider a trust a designated
beneﬁciary. The use of trusts as conduits of these beneﬁts for wealth transfer
purposes requires the settlor to select precise terms.119
The trust must be valid under state law,120 all trust beneﬁciaries must be
individuals not charities or estates,121 and the trust may not provide for indirect
payment of estate debts, expenses, or taxes.122 In addition, the beneﬁciaries must
be identiﬁable from the terms of the trust, and the trust must be irrevocable as
of the contributor’s death.123 Only if this format is precisely followed will the
trust beneﬁciaries be treated as designated beneﬁciaries and deferral of income
recognition under the deferred income rules apply.124 Even that is limited if the
trust has multiple eligible beneﬁciaries, in which case, the beneﬁciary with the
shortest life expectancy controls the rate of payout.125

116
Id. §§ 1361(d)(2), (e); Treas. Reg. § 1.1361-1(j)(b) (2001) (QSST requirements); I.R.C.
§§ 1361(c)(2)(B)(v), 641(c) (unfavorable tax treatment of ESBT); Jerald David August & Joseph
J. Kulunas, 0ROP 2EGS /N %3"43 -ORE 'UIDANCE &OR &AMILY 4RUSTS /WNING 3 3TOCK, 28 EST. PLAN.
459, 460 (2001) (explaining unfavorable tax treatment of ESBT).
117

Keith A. Herman, #OORDINATING 2ETIREMENT !CCOUNTS WITH %STATE 0LANNING  7HAT %VERY
%STATE 0LANNER .EEDS TO +NOW , PROB. & PROP., Jan.–Feb., 2006, at 53.
118

Id.

119

Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4, Q&A (5)(b) (2004).

120

Id.

121

Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(9)-4, Q&A (5)(c) and 1.401(a)(9)-4, Q&A (3) (2004).

122

See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401(a)(9)-8, Q&A (11) (2004) and 1.401(a)(9)-4, Q&A (3).

123

Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-4, Q&A (5)(b) (2004).

124

I.R.C. § 409(a)(9) (West 2002).

125

Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-5, Q&A (7)(a)(1) (2007).
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# 33) 0LANNING
Estate planning frequently involves planning for individuals with disabilities.
To properly plan for these individuals, the planner must consider the needs of the
individual and examine the resources available to the individual, including needbased government programs such as the Federal Supplemental Security Income
program (“SSI”).126 If an intended trust beneﬁciary is otherwise eligible for SSI,
the settlor must use care in crafting trust terms to assure the trust assets do not
have to be consumed as a prerequisite to SSI eligibility.127 Care must also be taken
to avoid claims on the trust assets by public agencies that have provided for the
beneﬁciary.128
In general, trust term selection is limited by the need to deny the trust
beneﬁciary rights such as the power to revoke the trust, appoint property of
the trust, or otherwise use the trust funds for support or maintenance. If not
so limited, the res of the trust may be depleted either before or as a result of
the beneﬁciary’s death. In addition, the trust terms must prevent distributions of
in-kind income for a beneﬁciary’s basic needs (food, clothing, or shelter).129

VII. CONCLUSION
The estate tax restricts the ﬂexibility of settlors in selecting trust terms. If this
were the only federal law impacting estate planning decisions, trust documents
would be less complex as a result of estate tax repeal. That is not the case. Even if
the gift tax joins the estate tax on the dust heap of tax history, the myriad of other
statutes similarly impacting trust term selection results in signiﬁcant complexity
which, at most, is only marginally reduced by repeal.
Still, other policy arguments raised by repeal proponents may, in the end,
justify permanent repeal of the estate tax. Perhaps it will be determined that the tax
does not raise a sufﬁcient amount of tax revenue to justify the cost of administering
and complying with the tax. Also, it may be concluded that the social goal of
breaking up large accumulations of wealth can better be accomplished with a
different taxing method. In terms of repealing the tax to avoid the imposition
of complexities on taxpayers as measured by constraints placed on their freedom
to select trust terms under state law, however, the complexities placed on many
taxpayers by the remaining tax laws and beneﬁts rules dwarf those which would
be removed by the repeal. In addition, the changed step up in basis regime that

126

42 U.S.C. § 1382 (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 416.200, et seq. (2008).

127

42 U.S.C. §§ 1382b(e)(5), 1396p(d).

128

42 U.S.C. §§ 1382b(e)(5), 1396p(d).

129

42 U.S.C. § 1382; 20 C.F.R. § 416.1130, et seq. (2008).
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comes into force with the repeal of the estate tax, replaces one set of constraints
with another set related to marshaling assets in potential trust form to better track
and account for basis characteristics.
The estate tax imposes constraints on the selection of trust terms and these
will be removed if repeal of the estate tax is made permanent. Those creating trusts
for a host of non-estate tax related reasons, however, will ﬁnd the documents no
less complex or restrictive as a result of other federal laws.
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